Tactical Tracking in Counter IED Operations course a success

Course Description

Tactical Tracking in Counter IED operations course is an intensive five day course of instruction designed for law enforcement, fire and is applicable to executive protection. It focuses on using visual tracking techniques to locate suspected roadside IEDs. Starting with a power point presentation, and field work, students learn basic tracking techniques, and gradually progress to team tracking. Students are then introduced to roadside IEDs currently in use by terrorists worldwide. This is also presented as a power point presentation supplemented by field work and very realistic simulated IEDS.
Topics include Prevention Strategies, Detection, Intelligence Gathering, as well as Post Blast Analysis. This holistic approach provides for the best possible outcome. The final day of the course concentrates on using visual tracking skills to locate roadside IEDs safely as a tracking team.

Historical development of the course

The development of the course stems from the use of roadside IEDS so popular in theater by terrorist insurgents. While billions have been spent finding high tech solutions to counter the increasing IED problem, few have found their way in to combat units successfully. The inherent problems of dust, heat as well as terrorist counter measures, and the various technologies interfering with operations have provided only minimal detection The other drawback is the cost for individual detection units are so costly they will find very limited use in domestic law enforcement, with the exception of agencies at the federal level.

The course was designed primarily for domestic law enforcement. It is entirely foreseeable that roadside IEDs will at some time in the near future be utilized as a viable tactic here at home. There is evidence that IEDs of this sort have already been found along our southern border with Mexico. The success of this tactic in Iraq and Afghanistan will be copied by our own domestic terrorists. USNORTHCOM and Department of Homeland Security under the Presidential Directive 19 are deeply involved in planning and rehearsing for roadside IED use in the United States.

This then was the basis for developing a course of instruction tailored for domestic Law Enforcement use. The course has taken nearly eight years to develop and refine the techniques. At its core it uses thousands of years old visual tracking technology. These proven tracking techniques are in my view one of the best ways to develop individual situational awareness in a tactical environment.

During the development of the course it became apparent that it would cover a broader range of use within the First Responder community. Fire and EOD units who would typically be responding and have operational control of IED call outs would find the course beneficial. The Executive Protection field is another unique profession that would benefit greatly by the techniques used in the course

By dividing the two primary topics of the course, (Tactical Tracking and Counter IED) into equal number of training modules it effectively reduced instruction time as well as placing emphasis only on techniques that actively supported detection of IEDs. To do this effectively the tracking operation had to be conducted as a team effort. This provided safety for the team as well as utilizing the visual sight of all team members. This results in a consistently high detection rate averaging 90%.

The visual tracking techniques were then combined with field optics (Binoculars) which provided a safer standoff distance for the tracking team. This remote viewing of the roadway surface and shoulder, plus effective communication between team members added greatly to the built in safety of the team concept.

By introducing actual terrorist IED tactics into the course, it effectively placed the tracking teams on a more pro active level safety wise, when responding to a call out involving IEDS. Providing realistic training devices that are currently used in theater also provides for easier recognition, and provides much more specific information that will be acted on quickly by other responding units.

Summary of training

The Tactical Tracking in Counter IED Operations course conducted in Arco Idaho, June 15 through the 19th 2009 was a huge success. Sponsored by the Butte County Sheriffs Department, the course was recently approved by Idaho POST. Although rainy conditions throughout the week hampered tracking operations, student trackers were able to meet all of the core objectives of the course.

Of the total number of IEDs (20 in all), a solid 88 % were successfully detected during the evaluation phase. This is clearly well above the 70 % minimum to pass the course. This is consistent with detection results found in theater in Afghanistan, and Iraq, Of the total number of IEDs detected in theater, 90 % of the IEDs are being found by people looking for them. This is sourced by an article appearing in the Mid East Edition of the Stars and Stripes, authored by Seth Robson in June of 2008.

The results clearly indicate that visual tracking techniques can enhance the ability of an individual to detect a high number of roadside IEDs safely as part of a tracking team. These results are credited in part to the increased situational awareness if the trackers during the course. The other key factors, is knowing where to look, and identifying what they are observing, as well as correctly interpreting the action indicators left upon the ground, led to the high evaluation scores.

The evaluation scenario, directed the tracking team to conduct 1-1/2 miles of C-IED road clearing operations in advance of a visiting dignitary that evening at 1700 hours. The tracking team quickly located the first IED in less than 40 minutes after the commencement of operations at 0800hrs. This effectively shut down the roadway to the principle, clearly pre-empting an IED attack, and possibly saving the life of the principle.

Conclusion
In summary, these results show that tracking in C-IED operations have great value, not only in Military and Law Enforcement, but in Executive Protection operations as well, in the areas of estate security and clearing short stretches of roadway. When compared to the high cost of using current state of the art counter IED technology, tracking offers a viable, as well as cost effective tool for use in protective efforts and tactical Law Enforcement operations.


Ted Williams CPS
Tactical Edge


EXPERT WITNESS SERVICES

Tactical Edge offers expert witness services to law enforcement and prosecution attorneys in terrorism related incidents involving response to IEDs (Improvised explosive devices) and the explosive effects of terrorist use of IEDs.
 

SOME THOUGHTS ON ANTI- TERRORISM, AND TRAINING

As concerned citizens we often wonder if our local law enforcement agencies are up to the task of fighting terrorism. For over 25 years I have advocated the training of law enforcement in the techniques of anti terrorism. Sadly this effort has for the most part fallen on deaf ears. I remember 25 years ago literally being laughed at by my contemporaries when mentioning terrorism and prevention in the same sentence. Surprisingly even after 9/11 anti-terrorism training can be difficult, or impossible to sell to management. The goal of prevention, and working more on a proactive level, rather than responding to incidents after the fact, still seems difficult for many in management to grasp. The key to solving this is training and follow-through. What good does it do to send training officers to train the trainer courses in critical anti terrorism subjects, and then not utilize them to train officers when they return to their respective agencies? Yet I’ve observed this phenomenon repeat itself hundreds of times over the years. Many department heads will come right out and tell you, we can use the things you learned if something ever happens in the future. I can assure you, it will simply be too late to apply that knowledge successfully during a terrorist incident. It must be applied long before an event occurs to be successful. For this to occur there needs to be evolution in management, an attitude that places more importance on prevention through good intelligence. Leaders must adapt to a new type of threat, and realize they are part of the war on terrorism here at home. They must pull themselves out of the traditional reactive mind set, and focus on prevention, and planning for terrorist events long before they occur.

While the level of training for many urban areas has increased since September 11, 2001, the level of training in many rural areas, particularly the western states is nearly non-existent. Many rural agencies simply feel left out of the loop, and vulnerable. Many of these agencies have a valid complaint as some of them are at great risk. The vastness and remoteness of the West tend to isolate it politically. As a result they have been left out in many areas related to training, and emergency preparedness.

Probably the biggest problem facing agencies in rural western states is the perception that many acts of terrorism have been to remote for them to worry about. They do not perceive themselves to be at risk, and have down played the terrorism aspects as over reaction. This deniability has traditionally been a huge barrier for decades. Many law enforcement managers simply do not believe the threat of terrorism will come knocking on the door. They simply couldn’t be more wrong.

Sadly for many agencies, this mindset and unwillingness to train for threats of this type will force them to play catch up when terrorism makes its debut in their hometown. When it does, how will they explain their lack of leadership to the victims of terrorist attacks? Over the years I have been able to assess the level of training, equipment, as well as the readiness of tactical teams in many areas of the west. When comparing these areas to the known threats and capabilities of terrorist groups both domestic and international, I have found that many teams have failed to train realistically for this type of threat. Most teams are simply not prepared for the realities of terrorist violence. This is not to say that all teams have failed in this regard. There are teams, which are very well trained, and capable, but they are also in the minority.

Many agencies in rural areas have small tactical teams, as well as mutual aid agreements with other agencies in the event assistance is needed. While this is a great concept, for it to work properly they must train together. The fact is many teams fail to train together often enough to be a real cohesive force, which can work together with minimal problems during an event. Just as worrisome is the fact that many teams are undermanned, under trained, and lack support from their leadership. The end result is growing apathy, frustration, and in some cases outright resentment towards management.

In short, much more needs to be done to correct these inadequacies. The bottom line is inadequately trained teams are a real liability to themselves, their agency, as well as the public. Training must become a priority for tactical teams who may have to respond to terrorist events and survive the encounter. Law enforcement leadership must be held accountable for gross negligence when ignoring critical training objectives when a terrorist threat is a possibility. That possibility has revealed itself on September 11, 2001.

There are as many reasons to train as there are reasons not to train. Nowhere is this truer than small rural agencies, which are understaffed, under trained, and lack the financial assets to obtain quality training. While these are legitimate concerns for any law enforcement management team they are only part of the overall problem. There are other more sinister forces at play; their names are legion within the law enforcement community. Many know it simply as politics, but it is more benign than that. I recognize them as ego, apathy, and indifference. These are the primary reasons good training gets sidelined or scrapped altogether. Unfortunately it’s the patrol officers on the street that will pay the high price of flawed policies, when based on flawed attitudes.

It’s also unfortunate that a good number of trainers as well as supervisors share many of these same traits. Of these, egos are probably the most damaging to department personnel. Egos can manifest themselves in a number of ways. The profile of ego driven trainers is a study in failure. In the past I have observed trainers who protect their positions no matter the cost. Specifically I am referring to those trainers who for reasons of ego, feel they are the only experts in their field, and so stifle other training that conflict with their own. These types of trainers are short on vision, creativity, and are closed to new ideas, and tactics. In short, they are not effective, and are a serious liability.

Just as serious are trainers who feel put out to perform the job of training professional officers. I’m talking about apathy, and indifference. Those trainers who are not passionate about training, exhibits no emotion, or those who put on the same tired, and worn out training month after month. Sadly many of these trainers will milk the system for many years, affecting every student they instruct with poor quality training. Instructors have a moral responsibility to those they train. If they cannot, or will not except this obligation, they have no business instructing, period. Training is serious business; it may very well mean the difference between coming home to the wife and kids every night, or never coming home again.

Many law enforcement supervisors are sometimes too quick to point out that they never have the time or funding, or the old stand by; we don’t need anti- terrorism of training. Simply put, these are just excuses for not training. Not all forms of training require large amounts of cash. There are many forms of training to be had for pennies on the dollar, or free of charge. Volunteer trainers are one example. Many Homeland Security terrorism courses offer excellent training at little or no cost to first responder agencies. Another is online courses, many of which are free. The FEMA Independent Study Program in emergency management as a great example. One excuse I always hear about is that unless you are a bonified, born with a gun, badge toten, POST certified trainer you have nothing of value to offer. This is perhaps the biggest falsehood I have observed. No one, not the so called experts, not the ego driven trainers, or myself have a monopoly on good training, or relevant information. I fully understand the need for certified instructors; all I am saying is, be willing to look outside the box at other alternatives. The days of canned exercises and mediocrity have to fall to evolution in training. This is a new time, with new threats, a new terrorism. The new terrorism places a high value on unconventional methods of operation, and attack. Law enforcement will have to think unconventionally to meet this threat.

Good training can come from many sources, even in small rural agencies if management is looking for it. Every town or major city has knowledgeable people, consultants, public services professionals that can be outstanding sources of training. Who are these people you ask? They are public utilities, power, water, security consultants, common people who may be expert in their respective fields, but remain unknown to law enforcement.

A good example is water and power systems found in every town in the country. So you ask, what information of value does water, and power systems have that officers need to know? The answer is quite simple. These are vital infrastructure nodes that are vulnerable to terrorism. As officers, you should have a basic understanding of these systems, and their vulnerabilities. Some of these systems may require risk assessments, and tactical site surveys to adequately protect them. Other skilled professionals are everywhere, from medicine, veterinarians, agriculture, manufacturers, or chemical facilities. These professionals have information you need to know. As a result they will have insights into certain aspects of terrorism you may not be aware of. To down play their contributions to law enforcement and security efforts simply because they are not POST certified trainers or law enforcement is laughable, if it were not so serious.

Yet another aspect of training places the responsibility of training squarely on the shoulders of the officers themselves. As officers you should be asking yourselves, what is my life worth? If you place a high value on your life, you should be seeking training on your own to supplement your academy course work. Often this means paying for it out of your own pocket. Almost half of my training in my law enforcement and protection work, I paid for myself. . There are many officers that are very reluctant to get training on their own if it is not mandated by the department. These officers obviously place a low value on themselves and should probably look for another line of work. I know these comments will offend some. However I feel I can discuss these issues with a fair amount of experience in law enforcement, and feel I have paid my dues. In the end it’s the responsibility of the individual to seek knowledge, and better himself. At the very least his owes it to his fellow officers and his family.

IED Prevention Strategies

   As our troops are rotating out of the Middle East, and leaving the service, some have returned to their old street gangs, bringing home and teaching imported IED technology they learned on the streets of Bagdad. We are already observing signs of imported IED technology within the street gangs.  While this trend is still in its infancy, we can expect a steady growth of technology as eager gangs find new ways to reinvent themselves, using more sophisticated weapons, and explosives. Other reasons for this growth are the fact that many gangs are showing signs of uniting and becoming super gangs. They are realizing that in organizing there is strength. The fact that gangs are combining and have shown a willingness to use deadlier weapons demonstrates a clear and present danger with national security implications.

   Muslim terror cells who are currently embedded in the US, as well as other Jihadists who are infiltrating through our insecure borders are also bringing and teaching this technology. The fact that many American Muslim Madrasas are corrupted by this radical ideology only underscores our need to be vigilant. We can no longer deny that the very possibility of home grown terrorists, as well as Islamic Jihadists using IEDs here at home exists. Terrorists worldwide are looking at this tactic, because it works. They are learning from their partners in Iraq, and Afghanistan just how effective the IED tactics are in terms of achieving strategic successes, as well as short term goals.

   The financing of counter IED operations, as well as research and development of detection technologies run in the millions of dollars annually. Sadly these expenditures have not produced the technological silver bullet. The Holy Grail of IED detection will allow detection over a standoff distance of 400 meters. Unfortunately this technology is 20 to 25 years in the future.

   The current thinking by many think tanks and government agencies focus only on developing high tech detection technologies. Many of these are expensive, in limited supply, and some require extensive training. Others may be limited to specific tasks, or operational areas, while others have interfered with other deployed technologies, further reducing there effectiveness. The harsh environmental conditions such as heat and dust have also contributed to the constant maintenance problems.

   So how can we deal with roadside IEDs effectively? First we have to recognize that it can happen in our country and begin educating the public, as well as the law enforcement community. Secondly, we have to recognize that technology alone, and of itself is not the answer. The combination of prevention strategies, detection technologies, intelligence, as well as training offers the best possible scenario for success. As an example, we must become more flexible, and allow commanders to change tactics as conditions on the ground change. After IEDs made there appearance in Iraq, the tactic of placing troops in armored vehicles for protection from IED blast effects came to the forefront. While this tactic has admittedly saved many lives, the question becomes is it the only viable tactic? Since the introduction of IEDs in Iraq, any commander who even suggested that troops return to dismounted patrols was ostracized and ridiculed, or perceived as not having the best interests of the troops in mind. There is some evidence to suggest that dismounted patrols can actually save lives as well. However it must be pointed out that dismounted patrols be used judiciously.

   Troops speeding by on main service routes in armored vehicles have almost no chance of observing an IED threat before driving into the lethal kill zone of an IED. There is simply not enough time to adequately observe the roadway for subtle signs which indicate a threat before you are on top of it. Dismounted troops on the other hand have a dramatically increased chance of recognizing IED threats simply because they have enough time to observe, evaluate, and come to a conclusion that a threat exists before entering the kill zone. Many will scoff at this approach, however to bolster my argument, a recent article sourced from AP research Department of Defense in June 2007 sited dismounted patrols were credited with preventing heavy US casualties. This article referenced IEDs exclusively. While it is agreed that foot patrols in urban areas places troops at risk of small arms fire, and rocket attacks, it is a less serious threat than buried explosives that are capable of overcoming armor.

   Many of these IEDs are buried several feet deep. And detonate by the heavy pressure an armored vehicle exerts on a pressure activated IED. An individual troops weight present insufficient weight to detonate such a device. Terrorists traditionally want to make these devices count, killing as many troops as possible in a single blast that they can. They are reluctant to detonate an IED such as this just to kill one person.

   While many of the more progressive Law Enforcement agencies see the possibility of roadside and vehicle IED attacks in the US, many are sending officers to IED familiarization courses. This is a good beginning toward being proactive, however it fails to address adequately, the IED problem. Simple identification of IED components and recognition must be combined with other tactics and technologies to be successful.  I have already demonstrated to a limited degree how combining technology and tactics can actually help to save lives. So the question becomes, what other tactics and technologies can we add to the mix to further enhance safety, as well as increase the detection of IEDs?

   First it is imperative that we develop a comprehensive prevention strategy which is realistic, effective, and enforceable. Prevention is absolutely essential when we talk about mitigating the effects of IED attacks. Simply put, prevention strategies involve denying terrorists access to targeted areas or hiding places for IED placement. One example of this involves the removal of trash on the streets. In Iraq, this is a huge problem because much of the infrastructure for trash removal is still being rebuilt, or is non existent. Regardless, high risk areas with historically high IED attacks should be targeted for trash removal, greatly limiting hiding places for IEDs, not only will it save lives, but it will also speed up road clearing operations. In the US time is money, and police management will be looking at reducing costs in terms of manpower vs time performing road clearing operations.

   In Iraq it is not unusual to observe dead animal carcasses along the roads. The terrorists have historically used these animal bodies to successfully conceal IEDs. In many rural areas of the US you can find an abundant variety of road kill as well. We cannot completely discount outright this tactic being used in the US to conceal IEDs. Again the best defense is prevention by denying the terrorist’s access to road kill along the roads. Dead animals and other roadside debris should be monitored and cleared away quickly. If this tactic is used in the US, dead animals even if not used to conceal IEDs could cause traffic stoppages and increase the number of false alerts to Law Enforcement. Quick and timely pickup of animal bodies is essential. Officers who regularly patrol roadways in their jurisdictions should immediately report any new bodies for removal as soon as detected. The public should also be informed that they have a role to play in keeping the roads safe, and should also feel free to report unusual activity along the roadways. Law Enforcement will not be able to go this alone; they must have public support and assistance for this strategy to be successful.

   Suspicious or abandoned vehicles along the roadways in Iraq, are often used as a come on, or prelude to an IED attack remotely detonated by an accomplice or on the scene by the driver. Abandoned vehicles could well pose the same threat here at home as well. Once IEDs make their debut on Americas highways the rules of the road will change forever. As in the above vehicle come on, it will be foolish for the good samaritan to stop and assist. In this instance reporting to Law Enforcement is by far the best strategy. Law Enforcement well also have to develop realistic and safe countermeasures against this threat. Officers will have to think about safe standoff distances when performing what used to be routine patrol functions. Time and distance are still the officers best allies, instead of parking immediately behind a suspicious abandoned vehicle to run a plate, officers should park a safe distance away. If the vehicles owner or driver is at the scene they should be directed to come to your location. All abandoned vehicles should be removed within hours, not days as is the custom in many jurisdictions.

   As a tool, checkpoints are by far the best way to detect and restrict the movement of terrorists. For decades we have seen their use in Europe, and the Middle East to detect suicide bombers, and contraband making its way into controlled areas. These same techniques can with modification be used in the United States as well. The British Army has for years used checkpoints in their battle to contain IRA terror. The Israeli police and Defense Force have also applied checkpoints to reduce suicide bombings and VBIEDS. As the war on terror continues the United States stands a very high probability of suicide, VBIEDs and roadside IED tactics being used against targets here at home. With this in mind it makes sense for Law Enforcement to apply these hard won techniques in planning for these types of events before they become a reality on the street.

   There are two types of vehicle checkpoints, urban and rural. Random checkpoints that are quickly set up are less vulnerable to terrorist attacks and deter terrorist movement, and more importantly result in increased apprehensions. Urban checkpoints are used primarily in heavy traffic areas for short periods of time, where the intent is to stop one vehicle in ten. In rural vehicle checkpoints, barriers and vehicles are used to partially block the roadway forcing drivers to negotiate an S turn to get through. The checkpoints are also capable of providing their own security, as well as performing vehicle searches.

   Vehicle searches conducted at checkpoints fall into three specific categories, the quick vehicle search, the though vehicle search, and the extensive vehicle search. Most checkpoints will conduct quick, or through vehicle searches. The extensive searches involve completely stripping down the vehicle. This requires specialists, and specialized equipment to perform. The extensive searches are conducted at a remote distance for safety. As always, circumstances will dictate what the OIC decides to do. A quick vehicle search could well progress into a through search. Immediate use intelligence on a specific vehicle, on a specific route could be targeted for a through search. In this case intelligence would indicate that a particular vehicle might be transporting IED components and explosives.

   Earlier I touched on educating the public. This is an area that allows the private citizen to join the war on terror. Many of our nation’s arrests of terror suspects are the direct result of private citizens willing to call law Enforcement and report suspicious behavior, or terrorist plots. By showing the public what to look for, and focus on, will directly influence the level of relevant information reported. This information carries more weight, and stands a chance of being acted on sooner rather than later.

   More emphasis needs to be placed on public awareness and reporting to police. Many officers view civilian involvement in such activities as a nuisance, playing down many reports as attempts to obtain their fifteen minutes of fame. This mindset has to change; the public is a major key to preventing attacks. Many private citizens know their neighborhoods and communities better than many police officers, and know immediately if something is suspicious or out of place. These types of citizens should be viewed as valuable assets instead of belittled. 

   Public awareness posters provide relevant, timely information about local threats, and reporting procedures. Mini security related seminars provide the public with specific information they can use for their own protection, as well as how to network and assist with security needs of their neighborhoods.

   Other aspects of preventing the IED threat unique to municipalities lie with the individual home, and business owner. In many communities within the United States garbage containers are routinely placed along the roadside for pickup, usually on a prearranged schedule. Many of these are placed along major routes and pose a hazard.

These containers are ready made to conceal IEDs, which can unwittingly be wheeled out by the owner. Communities should consider placing containers a small distance off the roadway, better yet change the collection point to the alleys instead of the main road. It would be unlikely that targeted vehicles would drive through alleyways.

   Newspaper vending machines along streets and intersections are also likely candidates for ied placement. An alternative would place these machines inside local businesses where access to terrorists planting an ied is very unlikely. Some businesses would appreciate the increase in customer traffic to their business. Telephone junction boxes can also be vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Many of these are located along major routes and intersections. Many types do not lock; they are secured only by a few sheet metal screws. An alternative is to place them underground with locked access covers and tamper proof tape.

  Another area of concern, which affects both rural and urban roadways, is the placement of mail boxes along the roads. These are ideal containers for the placement of IEDs. One countermeasure, is to place multiple boxes in on location that has a safe standoff distance from the roadway. Heavy brush and weeds along main roods offer perfect hiding places. Of course the obvious solution is to cut and trim back brush along the right of ways.

   While I have only introduced a few of the more obvious threats, the list could extend into the hundreds. Each of these will have to be given careful consideration and planning to mitigate the threats each will pose. Even a few isolated IED attacks on U.S roads will be calculated in the billions of dollars in lost trade and revenues, and will have a negative affect on money markets world wide. The implication of this are so staggering, it threatens to destroy the very fabric of our way of life. The hour draws late, we must begin now to prepare and mitigate the affects of this potential threat. In closing I leave the reader with one question only. Are you and your department ready to meet this threat?

This work is protected by copyright 2007 and written by Ted Williams CPS.

Contact: tacticalpubl@atcnet.net